Poverty traps and nonlinear income dynamics with measurement error and individual heterogeneity by Antman, Francisca & McKenzie, David J.
Poverty Traps and Nonlinear Income Dynamics with
Measurement Error and Individual Heterogeneity
Francisca Antman, Department of Economics, Stanford University
David J. McKenzie∗ , Development Research Group, World Bank
Abstract
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panels, measurement error, and attrition. This paper shows how dynamic pseudo-panel methods can
overcome these diﬃculties, allowing estimation of non-linear income dynamics and testing for the presence
of poverty traps. The paper explicitly allows for individual heterogeneity in income dynamics, to account
for the possibility that particular groups of individuals may face traps, even if the average individual
does not. These methods are used to examine the evidence for a poverty trap in labor earnings, income,
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d1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Does poverty beget poverty? The notion of a poverty trap, whereby current
poverty is a direct cause of poverty in the future, provides a powerful expla-
nation for the persistence of poverty and a rationale for numerous policy in-
terventions. The theoretical literature has provided several plausible models
which can give rise to poverty traps.1 A common feature of many theories of
a poverty trap at the micro-level is the combination of borrowing constraints
and an indivisible investment, leading to the existence of a critical threshold in
assets, income, or expenditure, which a household is unable to surpass if forced
below it. Examples include individuals who are too poor to purchase the mini-
mum level of nutrients needed for productive work (Dasgupta and Ray, 1986),
obtain a lumpy amount of education (Galor and Zeira, 1993), or buy physical
capital needed for entrepreneurship (Banerjee and Newman, 1993). Even with
convex technology, Mookherjee and Ray (2002) show that when employers or
lenders have all the bargaining power in contracts with workers or borrowers,
contractual distortions resulting from moral hazard can also give rise to poverty
traps.2
A sharp contrast to the poverty trap view of the world is the idea that
“anybody can make it” through hardwork and thrift, which Ghatak, Morelli and
Sjostrom (2001) term the American Dream eﬀect. In their model, capital market
imperfections may actually improve social welfare by providing incentives to
work hard while young, in order to enjoy rents in old age. Bowles, Durlauf and
Hoﬀ (2004, p.1) summarize this view as saying that “initial poverty typically
does not entrap; only those who don’t make the eﬀort remain in its clutches”.
Despite the striking diﬀerences in policy implications, the empirical litera-
1See Bardhan, Bowles and Gintis (2000), Azariadis and Stachurski (2004) and Bowles,
Durlauf and Hoﬀ (2004) for recent summaries.
2The reason is that such contracts need to provide poor agents with rents as an incentive
to exert eﬀort. As agents become richer, these rents are progressively withdrawn, eﬀectively
creating 100-percent marginal tax on wealth accumulation by the poor, and hence causing the
poor not to save. (Mookherjee and Ray, 2002).
2ture has found it hard to adjudicate between these two worldviews. One strand
of the empirical literature has attempted to test particular theories of poverty
traps. For example, Strauss and Thomas (1998) review studies which look for
nonlinear relationships between health and productivity, and McKenzie and
Woodruﬀ (2003) test for non-convexities in returns to microenterprise invest-
ment. These studies generally have not found support for poverty traps caused
by the particular mechanism being studied3, but leave open the question of
whether poverty traps may still arise due to the non-studied processes.
A second strand of recent literature has therefore attempted to look directly
at the dynamics of income, expenditure, or assets in order to test for non-
convexities and poverty traps. Lokshin and Ravallion (2004) use a six-year panel
from Hungary and four-year panel from Russia to carry out nonlinear estimation
of the relationship between current and lagged income. Almost one half of their
sample has attrited by the end of the panel, and so they use a systems estimator
which explicitly models attrition as a function of initial observed characteristics
of the household. They do ﬁnd the mapping from lagged income to current
income to be nonlinear, but ﬁnd no evidence of low-level threshold eﬀects which
would be associated with poverty traps. Jalan and Ravallion (2004) obtain
similar ﬁndings using a six-year panel of income from four provinces in China.
Carter and Barrett (2005) criticize the use of short panels of income or expen-
diture to test for poverty traps by claiming that they are unable to distinguish
between structural poverty and short-term transitory movements into and out
of poverty.4 This can be exacerbated by measurement error, which can lead a
household to be mis-classiﬁed as poor in one period and correctly classiﬁed as
non-poor in the next. They further note that many theories of poverty traps
are based on an asset threshold, and propose study of the dynamics of asset
poverty. Such an approach is followed by Lybbert et al. (2004), who use 17
3However, see Dasgupta (1997) for a critique of empirical studies of the nutrition-based
eﬃciency wage model.
4They note (p.2) that “with long enough panels, this limitation might be moot, but in the
short term...panels with more than two or three observations in a span of a few years remain
quite uncommon”.
3years of retrospective livestock history to examine wealth dynamics in southern
Ethiopia, ﬁnding some support for a poverty trap in livestock wealth. However,
panel data on assets is rare in developing countries, especially outside of an
agricultural context, and even when available, is likely to suﬀer from the same
measurement error and attrition issues as data on income.
This paper proposes a dynamic pseudo-panel approach to the estimation of
nonlinear income dynamics and uses this method to test for the presence of
poverty traps in Mexican income and expenditure.5 The use of pseudo-panels
can greatly mitigate the three major data issues facing the empirical study
of poverty traps: a lack of long panels, attrition, and measurement error. A
pseudo-panel tracks cohorts of individuals over repeated cross-sectional surveys
(Deaton, 1985). Since such surveys are often available over longer time-periods
than genuine panels, this approach can allow for the study of longer-term dy-
namics than is usually possible with panels. The Mexican Urban Labor Force
Survey (ENEU) used here is a quarterly rotating panel available from 1987-
2001. This enables us to use 58 quarters of data in the pseudo-panel estimation,
compared to panels of only 5 quarters.
Non-random attrition is much less of a problem in pseudo-panels than in
panels since a new sample of households is drawn in each period. In Antman
and McKenzie (2005), we show that construction of a pseudo-panel eliminates
the measurement error bias from dynamic linear models. This bias is found to be
large: panel data estimation would suggest that one-third of the gap in income
between two randomly selected households would close within one quarter, while
pseudo-panel analysis shows only 1.2 percent of this gap would be eliminated.
This paper extends the study of pseudo-panels to the non-linear dynamic models
needed for the study of poverty traps. We employ the functional form of Lokshin
and Ravallion (2004), in modelling income as a polynomial of lagged income.
5Only limited data on asset ownership, in the form of housing infrastructure, is available
in our survey and so we do not examine asset dynamics here. Nevertheless, the methods
proposed here could also be used to form pseudo-panel estimates of asset dynamics where
such data are available.
4We show that measurement error does not aﬀect the pseudo-panel estimates of
the slope coeﬃcients in this polynomial, enabling one to determine whether or
not the income mapping is non-convex. However, the second and higher-order
moments of the measurement error will have an eﬀect on the intercept term in
this polynomial, and we derive a correction factor for this term.
A further innovation in our approach is to explicitly allow for individual
heterogeneity in modelling income dynamics and testing for poverty traps. This
enables us to determine whether there are particular groups of individuals who
face traps, even if the average individual in society does not. For example,
an individual with higher ability or with a better intrinsic health endowment
may be able to produce more than an individual with the same lagged income
who has lower ability or intrinsic health. Figure 1 illustrates this case, plotting
three non-convex curves mapping lagged income to current income. Individuals
depicted by Curve A have non-linear income dynamics, but do not face a poverty
trap as the curve lies entirely above the 45 degree line. Individuals with income
dynamics following Curve C are always in a poverty trap. Curve B is the classic
poverty trap case, where there is a threshold level of income, Yu,b e l o ww h i c h
individuals are in a trap. Allowance for individual heterogeneity enables us to
check whether some individuals are in case B or C, even if the average individual
h a sd y n a m i c sg i v e nb yC u r v eA .
We begin by checking for the presence of poverty traps with the short panels
of household labor income. No individuals are found to have income dynamics
which would lead to a poverty trap, and indeed the results indicate high mobility
of incomes. However, such high mobility is likely to be the result of measurement
error, and we proceed to pseudo-panel estimation. The pseudo-panel estimates
do indeed show a greater inﬂuence for past income on current income than the
panel data results. However, although the nonlinear lagged income terms are
statistically signiﬁcant, they are small in magnitude, and the income mapping is
c l o s et ol i n e a ro v e rt h eﬁtted income range. While measurement error appears
to have large eﬀects on estimation of the slope coeﬃcients in this mapping,
correcting for the inﬂuence of higher order moments of the measurement error
5on the intercept term only marginally changes the estimated income mapping.
Based on this pseudo-panel estimation, we check whether the income dynamics
for the average individual in any of our cohorts give rise to a poverty trap
and ﬁnd they do not. Thus, while income mobility is low in Mexico, there
is no evidence for a poverty trap in income. These results continue to hold
once we allow for slope parameter heterogeneity across education groups, and
when we estimate dynamics for full household income and expenditure using an
alternative data set.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
econometric method used to estimate nonlinear income dynamics and detect
poverty traps with panels and pseudo-panels; Section 3 describes the ENEU
data; Section 4 provides the results; Section 5 examines the robustness of our
results to slope-parameter heterogeneity and to the use of alternative measures
of household resources than labor earnings; and Section 6 concludes.
2 Econometric Method
2.1 Panel Data without Measurement Error
We follow Jalan and Ravallion (2004) and Lokshin and Ravallion (2004) in
allowing for non-linear income dynamics in the form of a cubic function of the
lagged dependent variable, and in allowing for individual heterogeneity through
the inclusion of unobserved individual eﬀects, αi. We discuss below extension
to higher-order polynomials. The data generating process for the true income
Y ∗
i,t of household i in time period t is assumed to be:
Y ∗









¢3 + αi + ui,t (1)
If the true values of income are observed and the ui,t are serially uncorrelated,
then equation (1) can be estimated via the GMM method of Arellano and Bond
(1991). This is the method used by Jalan and Ravallion (2004), who diﬀerence




















With no measurement error in income, one can then obtain consistent esti-
mates b β1, b β2 and b β3. These parameter estimates enable us to determine whether
there is a non-convexity in the income mapping, but are not in themselves suﬃ-
cient to determine whether or not individuals face a poverty trap. If the income
mapping always lies above the 45 degree line, then a non-convex income map-
ping results in diﬀerent rates of income growth at diﬀerent levels of income,
but in no poverty trap. Curve A in Figure 1 illustrates this possibility. For a
poverty trap to exist, it must be either the case that the income mapping always
lies below the 45 degree line (as in Curve C of Figure 1), or that the income
mapping crosses the 45 degree line from below. Curve B in Figure 1 illustrates
this case.






,w ec a nt h e ns e et h a tan e c e s -
sary and suﬃcient condition for a poverty trap of the type given by Curve B in











Note that the function g depends on i due to the presence of the individual
eﬀects αi. Based on equation (1) and the parameter estimates b β1, b β2 and b β3,
we estimate αi by

























Then for our cubic speciﬁcation, the condition in (2) amounts to evaluating
whether





¢2 > 1 (4)
evaluated at the Y ∗
i,t−1 for which Y ∗
i,t = Y ∗
i,t−1.i . e .a t t h e ﬁxed point of the
estimated mapping gi (.). There may be particular periods when this occurs due
to a large shock, ui,t, but we want to know if this occurs for the expected ui,t
of zero. So we need to evaluate equation (4) at the Y ∗
i,t which solves:
Y ∗
i,t = b β1Y ∗








¢3 + b αi (5)
Equation (5) can then be solved to obtain the crossing point(s) Y ∗
i,t of each
individual’s income mapping. The condition in equation (4) can then be evalu-
ated for each individual at their speciﬁc crossing point(s) to determine whether
any individuals are estimated to face a poverty trap. As discussed in the in-
troduction, allowing for individual heterogeneity in a number of the theoretical
models of poverty traps may result in some individuals facing traps and not
others, and this methodology allows us to incorporate this possibility. In addi-
tion, one can determine whether the average individual income dynamics give
rise to a poverty trap by evaluating (4) at the crossing point determined by the
average b αi.
2.2 Panel Data with Measurement Error
In practice one does not observe the true income measure Y ∗
i,t,b u tr a t h e ro b -
serves Yi,t,w h e r e b y :
Yi,t = Y ∗
i,t + εi,t (6)
Here the measurement error εi,t is assumed to be mean zero and independently






ε. The data generating process
of the observed data is then:
8Yi,t = β1Yi,t−1 + β2Y 2
i,t−1 + β3Y 3
i,t−1 + αi + ηi,t (7)
where ηi,t = ui,t + εi,t
−
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As is well known, in the linear regression model with no individual hetero-
geneity, if the measurement errors are serially uncorrelated, the OLS estimate
of β1 will be biased towards zero, leading one to conclude that there is less
persistence in the income process than is truly the case. The Arellano-Bond
instrumental variable approach will also be inconsistent with measurement er-
ror except in special cases. In the linear model, if there is no autocorrelation
in the measurement error, using Yi,t−3 in place of Yi,t−2 as an instrument will
give consistency.6 However, in the quadratic and cubic cases earlier lags will
still result in inconsistency, and even in the linear case, autocorrelation in the
measurement error will rule out the use of earlier lags as instruments. Data from
validation studies on income in the U.S. does indeed suggest positive autocorre-
lation in the measurement error (Bound and Krueger, 1991). As a result, in the
presence of measurement error, these panel data estimates will be inconsistent
and therefore not enable one to determine whether there are non-convexities in
the income mapping or to detect the presence of poverty traps.
2.3 Estimation of non-linear income dynamics with pseudo-
panels
We propose using pseudo-panel methods to consistently estimate the income
mapping. A pseudo-panel tracks cohorts of individuals over repeated cross-
6To see this, note that the error term in the diﬀerenced equation contains ∆εi,t−β1∆εi,t−1.
As a result, Yi,t−2 will be correlated with the error term through εi,t−2.I ft h eεi,t are serially
uncorrelated, then E (Yi,t−3εi,t−2)=0and Yi,t−3 will serve as an instrument.
9sectional surveys.. Moﬃtt (1993), Collado (1997), McKenzie (2004) and Verbeek
and Vella (forthcoming) discuss conditions under which one can consistently
estimate linear dynamic models with pseudo-panels. Our aim here is to show
that these methods can also deal with the measurement error problems facing
panel data models, and to provide details for the estimation of non-linear income
dynamics.
Begin by taking cohort averages of equation (7) over the nc individuals
observed in cohort c at time t :




















+ αc(t) + ηc(t),t (9)
where Y c(t),t =( 1 /nc)
Pnc
i=1 Yi(t),t denotes the sample mean of Y over the in-
dividuals in cohort c observed at time t. With repeated cross-sections, diﬀer-
ent individuals are observed each time period. As a result, the lagged mean
Y c(t),t−1, representing the mean income in period t − 1 of the individuals in
cohort c observed at time t, (denoted here c(t)) is not observed. Likewise the
mean of the lagged square and mean of the lagged cubic are also unobserved.
Therefore we replace the unobserved terms with the sample means over the in-
dividuals who are observed at time t−1, leading to the following regression for
cohorts c =1 ,2,...,C and time periods t =2 ,...,T:


































































As shown in the general model of McKenzie (2004), as the number of in-
dividuals in each cohort becomes large, λc(t),t converges to zero, and hence we
will ignore this term in what follows.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case of linear dynamics, setting β2 and β3 to zero.
Then equation (10) becomes:
Y c(t),t = β1Y c(t−1),t−1
+αc(t) + uc(t),t
+εc(t),t − β1εc(t),t−1 (12)













That is, since the construction of the pseudo-panel involves averaging over
the observations in a cohort, we average out the individual measurement errors.
As a result, with suﬃcient observations per cohort, the measurement errors do
not aﬀect the consistency of estimates from equation (12). The parameter β1
and the cohort-speciﬁce ﬀects αc can then be estimated via OLS on the cohort
average equation (12). This will be consistent as the number of individuals per
cohort gets large.7
7Alternatively one can use lagged cohort means as instruments, as in Collado (1997).
McKenzie (2004) discusses the practical and theoretical issues involved in choosing between
the OLS and IV approaches to estimating linear dynamic models on cohort averages.
11In the more general case of non-linear income dynamics, OLS estimation of
the cohort average equation (10) will still lead to consistent estimates of β1, β2
and β3, allowing one to determine if there are non-convexities in the income
dynamics. However, the OLS estimates of the cohort-speciﬁce ﬀects αc will be
biased. To correct for this bias we need to impose further restrictions on the
form of the measurement error. In particular, we assume that:













over time. We can allow the variance of the measurement errors to diﬀer
across cohorts.
iii) The measurement errors are independent of the true values within a co-
hort, so εi,t is independent of Y ∗
i,t for all i in a given cohort c.
Under these assumptions, based on equations (7) and (8), one can easily
show that as nc →∞ ,t h eO L Se s t i m a t eo fαc, b αc converges as follows:
b αc
p













is the cross-sectional mean in income for individuals in cohort
c at time t−1. Under assumptions (ii) and (iii) we have that the cross-sectional

























the sample cross-sectional variance of observed incomes, and on an estimate of





/Va r(Yi,t). Proxies for this reliability ratio can be obtained from
validation studies (see Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz, 2001). We calculate b σ
2
ε
12for two diﬀerent values of θ, 0.5 and 0.8, which span the main range of estimates
found in U.S. validation studies. Under the assumption that the measurement





with the sample cross-
sectional mean Y c(t−1),t−1, and therefore estimate αc by:
e αc = b αc + b β2b σ
2
ε +3b β3Y c(t−1),t−1b σ
2
ε (16)
Under assumptions (i)-(iii), as the number of individuals in each cohort goes
to inﬁnity, e αc will provide a consistent estimate of the cohort eﬀect αc.
Based on these estimates, one can then go back to equations (4) and (5) at
the cohort mean level, in order to determine whether any speciﬁc cohort faces a
poverty trap by determining the slope of the estimated cubic income mapping
a tt h ei n c o m el e v e l ( s )a tw h i c ht h e4 5d e g r e el i n ei sc r o s s e d .
Note that at no stage did we impose any restrictions on the serial correlation
properties of the measurement error. Since diﬀerent individuals are observed in
each time period, we can allow for arbitrary patterns of correlation over time in
the measurement errors provided that we assume cross-sectional independence
of the measurement errors across individuals.8
Secondly, note that extension of this method to higher order polynomials
in the lagged dependent variable will require imposing more structure on the
distribution of the measurement error term in order to estimate αc. One can still
obtain consistent estimates of the slope parameters β without these additional
assumptions, but the corrections for measurement error needed to estimate αc
will involve assumptions on higher-order moments of the εi,t’s. For example,
with a quartic, the correction requires an estimate of the fourth moment of the
measurement error, along with an estimate of the cross-sectional variance of
true income.
In practice this methodology oﬀers several advantages over using genuine
panel data. In many situations genuine panel data are not available, or are
available for only short periods, whereas much larger samples over longer periods
8More generally, we can allow for a ﬁxed component in the measurement error term for
each cohort, which gets captured in the cohort-speciﬁce ﬀect αc.
13of time are available with cross-sectional surveys. Secondly, an important issue
with the examination of income dynamics with genuine panel data is the extent
to which non-random attrition biases the results. In particular, one may be
concerned that individuals whose incomes suﬀer large falls or large increases
m a yb em u c hm o r el i k e l yt om o v eh o u s e sa n dl e a v et h es a m p l e .W h i l et h e r ea r e
structural approaches one can take to attempt to account for attrition (e.g. see
Lokshin and Ravallion (2004)), the use of pseudo-panel data is not subject to
t h e s es a m ea t t r i t i o ni s s u e s .T h i r d l y ,t h eu s eo fd i ﬀerent individuals each period
allows for very general forms of serial correlation in the individual measurement
errors. The main disadvantage of the use of pseudo-panels instead of genuine
panels for the purpose of identifying poverty traps is that while we can still
allow for heterogeneity of the intercept at the individual level, we can only
evaluate the condition in equation (4) for each cohort at the crossing point(s)
determined by the cohort average intercept, rather than at a separate intercept
for each individual. This enables us to determine whether the income dynamics
of the average individual within a particular cohort give rise to a poverty trap.
3D a t a
T h ed a t ac o m ef r o mM e x i c o ’ sE n c u e s t a Nacional de Empleo Urbano (ENEU),
a quarterly urban employment survey collected by Mexico’s Instituto Nacional
de Estadística, Geografía e Informática (INEGI) over the period from the ﬁrst
quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2001.9 Over this period the ENEU
expanded coverage from 16 cities in 1987 to 34 cities by the end of 1992 and 44
cities by the second quarter of 2001. We include all 39 cities present by the end
of 1994, although our results are robust to restricting the sample to just the 16
cities present in all years. The survey is designed as a rotating panel, with
households followed for ﬁve consecutive quarters. In addition to information on
household demographics and education of all members, each individual aged 12
and above in the household is asked detailed questions about employment and
9The survey was changed after this date, preventing the use of more recent data.
14labor income. As is common in many such surveys, the survey tracks a dwelling
unit, so that individuals which move houses attrit from the panel.
We examine income dynamics at the household level and test whether poverty
traps exist for households. The ENEU only collects data on labor earnings for
each household member in their principal occupation. We add this over house-
hold members and deﬂate by the Consumer Price Index for the relevant quarter
from the Bank of Mexico to obtain real household labor earnings. To focus
only on households for whom labor earnings are likely to be a main source of
income, we restrict our sample to households with heads aged 25 to 49 years
old. On average two percent of the observations have household labor income of
zero. Using data from the ENIGH income and expenditure survey, which does
include non-labor sources of income, we calculate that labor income represents
95 percent of total monetary income for urban households with heads in the
25-49 year old age range. In Section 5 we examine the robustness of our results
to using full income and expenditure from the ENIGH.
After imposing these restrictions on the age of the household head and drop-
ping missing values, we have 54 ﬁve-quarter panels, beginning with the panel
of 3,930 households which were sampled from the ﬁrst quarter of 1987 through
to the ﬁrst quarter of 1988, and ending with the panel of 11,158 households
sampled from the second quarter of 2000 through to the second quarter of 2001.
This gives a total sample of 402,052 households. Ten percent of households are
observed for only one quarter, while approximately 65 percent can be followed
for all ﬁve quarters. For our panel data analysis we use unbalanced panels,
resulting in 1,671,530 household-quarter observations in all.
Pseudo-panels are constructed on the basis of ﬁve year birth intervals of
the household head interacted with three education levels (primary schooling or
less, 7 to 12 years education, and more than 12 years education). For example,
all household heads born between 1960 and 1964 with primary schooling or less
would form one cohort. The household head is deﬁned as the person recognized
as the head by the other household members and is generally male. A potential
concern with the panel data is that households who fall into or escape out of
15poverty may be the most likely to move, and therefore attrit from the panel. In
order to ensure that the pseudo-panel does not suﬀer from the same problem,
we construct our pseudo-panel using only the households who are in their ﬁrst
wave of the interview. As a result, we use just over 20 percent of the households
available in any given cross-section, since the remaining households are those
which are being re-interviewed. We restrict the sample further to cohorts with
more than 100 observations in a given wave in order to be able to apply the
asymptotic theory developed above which relies on a large number of observa-
tions per cohort. Approximately 9 percent of cohort-period observations have
fewer than 100 households, and including these additional observations does
not qualitatively aﬀect our results. After these restrictions, we are left with a
pseudo-panel over 58 quarters with 842 cohort-quarter observations.
4R e s u l t s
In order to get a sense of the relationship between income and lagged income
over time, we begin with a locally weighted regression between household income
and the quarterly lag of household income in the panel.10 Figure 2 shows the
estimated relationship. Current income is seen to be an increasing function of
lagged income, with the curve intersecting the 45 degree line only once, from
above. Therefore, equation (2) does not hold, as the derivative of the curve is
clearly less than unity at the intersection point, and thus there is no evidence
of a poverty trap.
However, as argued above, it is important to take individual heterogene-
ity into account. Figure 3 shows the results from the panel data using the
Arellano-Bond (1991) instrumental variables speciﬁcation. This diﬀerences the
data and uses lagged income as an instrument for the ﬁrst diﬀerence of lagged
income. Curves are then plotted for the average individual eﬀect. The cubic
and quadratic curves are now highly linear in shape, and all three curves show
10See Knieser and Li (2002) for discussion of estimation of local regressions with dynamic
data.
16almost no relationship between current income and lagged income, after condi-
tioning on individual eﬀects. In Table 1 we then examine whether equation (2)
holds for particular individuals, even if it doesn’t hold for the average individual.
For each of the linear, quadratic, and cubic speciﬁcations, we use equation (3)
to estimate αi for each individual, and then following equations (4) and (5), we
evaluate the derivative of the estimated curve for each individual at the income
level(s) where the curve crosses the 45 degree line. For the linear model there is
only one crossing point, the quadratic model is evaluated at the two roots, and
the cubic at the three roots. We report the derivative at the minimum, 25th,
50th, 75th, and maximum values of the distribution of estimated αi’s.
Of course the derivative is constant for the linear model, and is estimated to
be only 0.019, well below one. The estimated quadratic crosses the 45 degree line
twice: once for highly negative income, and once for a positive value of income.
The derivatives at the crossing point for positive incomes range from -0.005 to
0.034, and are again much less than one. The cubic model has one negative, and
two positive crossing points. The derivative at the crossing point with the lower
level of positive income ranges from -0.048 to 0.049. While the derivative at the
second positive crossing point is greater than unity (between 3.0 and 3.6), this
crossing point occurs at a very high level of income, beyond the income range
of the data. Hence within the observed range of positive incomes, all three
panel data speciﬁcations show a derivative at the crossing point which is very
close to zero. This certainly does not provide support for a poverty trap, but
instead shows a very fast rate of conditional convergence of incomes. However,
as shown in Antman and McKenzie (2005), this instrumentation approach will
always give this result for the linear model when there is measurement error,
regardless of the true shape of the linear dynamics. We therefore proceed to
pseudo-panel estimation, which averages out the measurement error and gives
consistent slope parameter estimates.
Figure 4 illustrates the importance of allowing for individual heterogeneity
in the dynamics. The curve for the quadratic model when we assume a com-
mon intercept for all cohorts lies right on top of the 45 degree line, suggesting
17a one-to-one relationship between income and lagged income. However, once
we allow for heterogeneity in the individual intercepts, the slope of the curve
ﬂattens. Plotting the curve for the average cohort intercept, we see that the
curve crosses the 45 degree line from above, so again there is no poverty trap for
the average cohort. Table 2 shows that when we examine this derivative across
the distribution of cohort intercepts, it ranges from 0.774 to 0.790, and is thus
always less than unity.
Figure 5 compares the panel and pseudo-panel estimates of the linear dy-
namic model. The pseudo-panel results show much lower mobility of incomes
than the genuine panel would suggest, but still cross the 45 degree line from
above. The top of Table 2 shows that the derivative for the pseudo-panel is
0.730, less than unity. In addition, it shows that the curve always crosses the 45
degree line at a positive level of income, so no cohorts have income mappings
which lie entirely below the 45 degree line (as in Case C in Figure 1).
Figures 6 and 7 compare the panel and pseudo-panel curves for the quadratic
and cubic models respectively, again plotting the curves at the average of the
estimated cohort-speciﬁc intercepts. A second pseudo-panel curve is plotted
after making the correction for the impact of higher order moments of the mea-
surement error on the estimated cohort intercepts, using the procedure outlined
in equations (15) and (16), assuming a reliability ratio of 0.5. The coeﬃcients
on the quadratic and cubic terms are statistically signiﬁcant at all conventional
levels, providing evidence of some non-linearity in the income mapping. How-
ever, the coeﬃcients are small in magnitude, so that the ﬁtted curves appear
close to linear over the observed sample range. As with the linear model, the
quadratic and cubic pseudo-panel curves are steeper than the panel curves, sug-
gesting that measurement error is causing one to overestimate the degree of
mobility in panels, and make one less likely to detect poverty traps. However,
the correction for the impact of higher-order moments of the measurement error
has little visual impact, which is likely to be a result of the estimated curves
being close to linear over the range of observed data.
The second and third parts of Table 2 compare the estimated derivatives of
18the quadratic and cubic model with and without this correction for the higher-
order moment impacts of measurement error. Results are presented for relia-
bility ratios of 0.5 and 0.8. As with the genuine panel model, the pseudo-panel
quadratic model only crosses the 45 degree line once in the range of positive
incomes. The estimated derivative at the crossing point ranges from 0.774 to
0.790 without the additional measurement error correction. Making this correc-
tion only results in changes of 0.001 or less in the estimated derivatives. The
cubic model again has two positive roots, with one root having a large deriva-
tive but being at high levels of income beyond the range observed in the data.
The derivative at the crossing point within the range of observed income levels
ranges from 0.796 to 0.902 without the additional measurement error correction,
and from 0.793 to 0.897 with this correction. The derivatives therefore do vary,
showing the importance of allowing for heterogeneity. The derivatives also vary
somewhat from the linear model derivative of 0.730, showing some evidence for
non-linearities in income dynamics. Nevertheless, all of the derivatives at the
crossing points are less than unity, and hence do not support the existence of a
poverty trap.
Overall these results therefore show that the panel data estimates appear
to greatly understate the slopes of the income dynamic curves at the cross-
ing points, thereby making it unlikely that they will detect derivatives greater
than one, and hence poverty traps. Nevertheless, although the pseudo-panel
estimates show less mobility in incomes, they do not provide any evidence of
poverty traps in income: all of the derivatives are less than unity. While the
quadratic and cubic terms are statistically signiﬁcant in the pseudo-panel model,
providing evidence for non-linear income dynamics, these non-linearities are not
very large in magnitude over the observed income range, and do not give rise
to poverty traps.
195R o b u s t n e s s
5.1 Slope parameter heterogeneity
Our analysis has allowed for heterogeneity in the intercept term in the equation
mapping lagged income to current income. It is also of interest to examine
whether the shape of the income mapping also exhibits heterogeneity, and if
so, to determine whether allowing for heterogeneity in the slope parameters
will reveal evidence of a poverty trap. One problem with this approach is that
allowing for more heterogeneity results in fewer observations being available to
estimate each curve. We therefore chose to only allow for limited heterogeneity
in the income mapping, letting the parameters β1,β 2, and β3 in equation (10)
diﬀer according to three levels of education of the household head (0-6 years, 7-
12 years, and 13 or more years). This allows for the possibility that individuals
with higher education may be better able to overcome barriers to investment
at low income levels, possibly by substituting skills for physical capital, or by
being better able to access credit markets.
Figure 8 plots the estimated curves for the three education groups, at the
average level of the cohort-speciﬁc intercepts. We do indeed see heterogeneity
in income dynamics by education level. The income mapping is steeper for
higher education levels, indicating more rapid income growth, and the point
of intersection with the 45 degree line lies at a higher level of income. As a
result, individuals with high education and low income will experience faster
income growth than individuals with the same income and lower education.
Nevertheless, one still sees that each of the three curves crosses the 45 degree
line from above, so that there is no poverty trap in incomes, even after allowing
for slope heterogeneity in dynamics across education groups. The derivatives
evaluated at the intersection with the 45 degree line are all below unity, ranging
from 0.77 at a crossing point of 5,330 for the lowest education group to 0.81 at
an income level of 7,584 for the mid-level group and 0.87 at a crossing point of
approximately 17,944 for the highest education group.
205.2 Beyond Labor Income
The above results ﬁnd no evidence of poverty traps in Mexican labor income.
One potential concern is that some of the households with very low or zero
labor income could be non-poor due to other sources of income, such as auto-
consumption, transfers, rent and interest. As these households are not poor,
we would not expect to ﬁnd them in a poverty trap. However, their inclusion
among other households with similar labor income levels who rely much more
on labor income in the estimation of income dynamics is likely to reduce the
chance of detecting poverty traps for this latter group.
We therefore examine the robustness of our results to the use of more com-
prehensive measures of household welfare. We use data from Mexico’s National
Income and Expenditure Survey, the Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de
los Hogares (ENIGH). This survey has been taken biannually since 1992, and
we use the six rounds from 1992-2002.11 To allow direct comparison with the
urban employment survey, we use only data from cities of population 100,000
and above. As with the ENEU data, we restrict our analysis to households with
heads aged 25 to 49, and deﬁne cohorts based on ﬁve year birth intervals of the
household head within three education groups. This results in a sample size
of between 3,000 and 4,000 households in each round. Further restricting the
number of observations per cohort in a round to be at least 100 results in a
pseudo-panel of 19 cohorts observed over 6 time periods.12
We consider four measures of household welfare. The ﬁrst measure is total
household labor income from the principle occupation of each member, which
corresponds to the measure we have used in the ENEU. The second measure is
total monetary income of the household, which includes household income from
11Earlier rounds of this survey were also conducted in 1989 and 1984. The inclusion of these
surveys would require estimating income dynamics over unequally-spaced time periods. While
in principal the methods of McKenzie (2001) could be extended to cover the measurement
error case, we choose to focus on the equally-spaced surveys for this paper.
12There are 82 cohort-wave observations, since some cohorts are not observed in every round,
either due to insuﬃcient observations, or due to the cohort being out of the 25-49 year age
range for the household head.
21pensions, government transfer programs, rent, interest, remittances, and other
monetary sources. The third measure, which we will call full income, adds the
value of home-produced consumption, or auto-consumption, to monetary in-
come. The ﬁnal measure is total expenditure, which includes both monetary
expenditure and the value of autoconsumption. The correlation between house-
hold labor income and total household monetary income averages 0.91 across the
six surveys for urban households with heads in the age range 25-49. We should
therefore expect similar results for these two measures. The correlation with full
income is not much less, at 0.87, while the correlation with total expenditure is
0.60.
Figure 9 plots the ﬁtted cubic income mappings for these four measures of
household welfare. The curves are plotted at the average of the cohort speciﬁc
intercepts, with a measurement error correction made as in equation (16) under
the assumption that the reliability ratio is 0.5.F i r s t ,w en o t et h a ts h a p eo ft h e
estimated curve for labor income is very similar to that from the ENEU, seen
in Figure 7. Secondly, total monetary income of the household has very simi-
lar income dynamics as labor income, showing that the omission of secondary
job and non-labor earnings does not appear to have a sizeable impact on the
estimated dynamics. However, thirdly, we note that the shape of full household
income, which includes the value of home-produced goods, and the shape of the
expenditure relationship do exhibit more curvature than labor earnings. Nev-
ertheless, most importantly we see that all four measures of household welfare
have mappings which cross the 45 degree line from above, hence showing that
our ﬁnding of no evidence for poverty traps extends to these other measures.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has shown how pseudo-panel methods can be used to investigate
non-linear income dynamics in the presence of measurement error and individ-
ual heterogeneity. Panel data estimates suggested that income was very mobile,
conditional on individual ﬁxed eﬀects, and that no individuals have income
22dynamics which could give rise to a poverty trap. Pseudo-panel analysis re-
veals more persistence in labor earnings, suggesting that measurement error is
rather large in the panel data. Nevertheless, although we ﬁnd some evidence of
non-linearities in income dynamics, we estimate that the mapping from lagged
income to current income always crosses the 45 degree line with a derivative less
than unity. Hence, there is no evidence for a poverty trap in labor income. This
result is robust to allowing diﬀerent education groups to exhibit diﬀerent income
dynamics, and to using full income or expenditure in place of labor earnings.
In related work, Antman and McKenzie (2005) show that absolute mobility
in Mexico is very low, suggesting that the high level of cross-sectional inequality
in incomes will persist over time. Thus although the lack of a poverty trap
suggests that poor individuals can experien c ei n c o m eg r o w t hl i t t l eb yl i t t l eo v e r
time, and not be trapped below some threshold level, this will be a rather slow
process. The “Mexican dream” may therefore take a long time to be realized.
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25Figure 1:  Individual Heterogeneity, Non-Convexities and Poverty Traps
 
All curves display non-convexities and are simply shifted up or down due to different values of αi.  
Curve A does not display a poverty trap because it does not intersect the 45 degree line from below.  
Curve B demonstrates the case where there is a distinct poverty trap for those below income level Yu.  
Curve C is the case where everyone is subject to a poverty trap and is easily 
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Solution 3 50% 5078.0293 0.048
75% 8296.748 0.048
Max 1381106.8 -0.048
1Solution refers to the solution to the equation Yi,t=β1Yi,t + β2Yi,t
2 +β3Yi,t
3 + αi
where the number of terms in the polynomial correspond to the linear, quadratic and cubic models. 
2Derivative refers to the derivative of the polynomial evaluated at the solution
3Variance Ratio refers to Var(Yi,t*)/Var(Yi, t), where * indicates truth
Linear Model
Quadratic Model









Solution Derivative Solution Derivative Solution Derivative
Min -416471 1.226 Min -416437 1.226 Min -416386 1.226
25% -406714 1.216 25% -406678 1.216 25% -406624 1.216
Solution 1 50% -403459 1.213 50% -403423 1.213 50% -403368 1.213
75% -402271 1.212 75% -402234 1.212 75% -402179 1.211
Max -400502 1.210 Max -400465 1.210 Max -400410 1.210
Solution Derivative Solution Derivative Solution Derivative
Min 3636 0.790 Min 3599 0.790 Min 3544 0.790
25% 5405 0.788 25% 5368 0.788 25% 5313 0.789
Solution 2 50% 6593 0.787 50% 6557 0.787 50% 6502 0.787
75% 9848 0.784 75% 9812 0.784 75% 9758 0.784
Max 19605 0.774 Max 19571 0.774 Max 19520 0.774
Solution Derivative Solution Derivative Solution Derivative
Min 1831966 6.228 Min 1831958 6.228 Min 1831947 6.228
25% 1832363 6.233 25% 1832355 6.233 25% 1832343 6.232
Solution 1 50% 1832461 6.234 50% 1832453 6.234 50% 1832441 6.234
75% 1832491 6.234 75% 1832484 6.234 75% 1832472 6.234
Max 1832534 6.235 Max 1832526 6.234 Max 1832514 6.234
Solution Derivative Solution Derivative Solution Derivative
Min -49921 1.213 Min -50114 1.214 Min -50402 1.215
25% -38242 1.143 25% -38528 1.145 25% -38951 1.147
Solution 2 50% -34352 1.120 50% -34692 1.122 50% -35192 1.125
75% -32960 1.112 75% -33324 1.114 75% -33859 1.117
Max -30870 1.100 Max -31278 1.102 Max -31873 1.106
Solution Derivative Solution Derivative Solution Derivative
Min 3965 0.902 Min 4381 0.900 Min 4988 0.897
25% 6098 0.890 25% 6470 0.888 25% 7017 0.885
Solution 3 50% 7521 0.883 50% 7869 0.881 50% 8381 0.878
75% 11508 0.861 75% 11802 0.859 75% 12238 0.857
Max 23584 0.796 Max 23785 0.795 Max 24085 0.793
1Solution refers to the solution to the equation Yi,t=β1Yi,t + β2Yi,t
2 +β3Yi,t
3 + αc, 
where the number of terms in the polynomial correspond to the linear, quadratic and cubic models. 
2Derivative refers to the derivative of the polynomial evaluated at the solution
3Variance Ratio refers to Var(Yi,t*)/Var(Yi, t), where * indicates truth
Variance Ratio=.5
Measurement Error Correction





No Measurement Error Measurement Error Correction
Variance Ratio
3=.8